The Case of Yemen

Yemen

Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s grip on power grew even more tenuous this week, as top generals, politicians and tribal leaders defected to the opposition. The news of the defections was met by the protestors with jubilation. At this rate, the question of Saleh losing power has shifted from “if” to “when”.  However, this Machiavellian politician has managed to stay in office for three decades and his survival skills should not be underestimated.

Right now, Yemen appears to be following the lead of the Tunisia and Egypt; other countries that managed to overthrow despots who had ruled for decades.  But even if Yemen manages to shake off Saleh and his regime, the country still faces monumental challenges in the days ahead. These issues need to be addressed immediately and a prolonged conflict could spell doom for this Arab nation.

Before the Arab revolution, Yemen was dealing with rebels in the north and separatists in the south. The country will be out of oil and water in ten years. There is a strong al-Qaeda presence. Now we can add widespread political unrest to the list. Complicating matters is the fact that Yemen shares a border with Saudi Arabia. For our purposes, these are the relevant facts.

Timeline

Ali Abdullah Saleh was selected by parliament to be president of North Yemen in 1978. North and South Yemen were united in 1990. In January 2011, protests erupted in the capital, Sana’a. The protests continued throughout February, with demonstrators demanding Saleh step down. On March 18, up to 50 protestors were gunned down in the capital by men believed to be regime loyalists. The killing of the protestors seemed to mark a turning point, as several major figures (tribal leaders, generals, high-level politicians and diplomats) began siding with the opposition.

The biggest hit to the regime came with the defection of Major General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar. It is now believed that at least half the army is with the opposition. There have been reports of army soldiers clashing with loyalist Republican Guards, which are led by Saleh’s son Ahmed.  General Ahmar has sent forces to protect the protestors from the state, similar to the role the military played in Egypt.

Tribes

Like Libya, Yemen has a strong tribal presence. Some major tribal leaders have begun defecting to the opposition, but it is unclear how they would fair in a democracy. The tribes wield a tremendous amount of power, which is sure to be diluted in the installation of a true representative government in Yemen.  Saleh may not be much of a leader, but he might be the only force capable of holding the country together. Yemen could fragment along tribal lines if and when Saleh steps down or is removed.

Saleh

Saleh’s deft political maneuvering is what has kept him in power for over thirty years. Many factions have been upset with him during that period, just not all at the same time.  Saleh was a master of juggling alliances to keep enemies at bay to remain in office. When threatened by one group gaining too much power, he would prop up another group to balance things out, and the next month he would do the opposite. Saleh made sure that no faction grew too strong or too weak, and somehow he always managed to come out on top.

Externally, he was almost as skillful. Yemen borders Saudi Arabia, and Saleh was able to play on Saudi paranoia of Iran to guarantee support from the Kingdom. Saleh’s diplomatic overtures to Iran would be countered by Saudi Arabia, who would use its influence with the Yemeni tribes to help the Saleh avoid trouble and remain in power. He used the same strategy with the United States, always playing on fears of Al-Qaeda to extract aid and support from Washington.

Challenges

Yemen is in rough shape. It is already the poorest country in the Middle East, with unemployment around 35%. Three quarters of government revenue comes from oil, which is expected to run out within the decade.

During that same time, Yemen is also predicted to be the first country to run out of water. There are two main reasons for this: drought and qat. Nothing can be done about the drought, but problems from qat are manmade.

Qat is a mildly-narcotic plant whose leaves are chewed for the desired stimulant effect. It’s use in Yemen is rampant, especially in men. The usefulness of the plant is debatable (life in Yemen is hard and it’s natural for people to look for an escape), but its effects on the environment are undeniable. The plant sucks up an atrocious amount of water yet bares no fruit, only the leaves.  But try telling that to the people who grow it, who have no other sources for earning an income for their families.

Qat farming is one of the only viable industries in Yemen and the use of water in its cultivation takes an enormous toll on the nation’s aquifer. Hundreds of illegal wells have been dug and used up dry. Competition for water sources is fierce and is often the cause of violence.  This will continue to be a growing problem for Yemen, especially with a guns per capita ratio second only to the United States.

To make matters worse, the state is using oil to fuel water pumps and desalinization plants. Running out of oil or water would be a disaster for any country. Running out of both at the same time could be fatal. Yemen faces the possibility of running out of water, its largest natural resource and supplier of government revenues (oil), and its only major crop and employer (the qat industry) all at the same time.

Conclusion

Whatever results come from the protests, Yemen faces a historic catastrophe in the not-too-distant future. Any government that comes out of the turmoil will have to address these problems immediately, and should seek support from the international community to do so.

 

 

Top 5 MEA Murder Mysteries

*Editor’s note: Everything in this article is speculation, all evidence circumstantial.

5. Sayyed Abdul-Majid al-Khoei

Born/Died/Age 1962-2003 (age 40)

Base of Operations Iraq

Who Was He? Sayyed al-Khoei was a widely respected Shiite religious figure in Iraq who fought against the Saddam Hussein regime in the 1991 Shia uprising. He was forced to flee Iraq and settle in London, where he worked for the al-Khoei foundation to give the Shia a voice in the international community.  After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, al-Khoei returned from exile and was promptly murdered. He was hacked to death by unknown assailants and died at Moqtada al-Sadr’s front door. When Sadr learned that al-Khoei was mortally wounded and bleeding to death on his doorstep, Sadr reportedly ordered is men to have al-Khoei moved to die somewhere else.

Location of Death Najaf, Iraq

Likely Suspects Moqtada al-Sadr followers, Sunni Baathists

Best Guess Moqtada al-Sadr’s followers possibly killed al-Khoei in order to eliminate a rival of their leader. It’s unclear whether Sadr ordered al-Khoei’s murder, but Sadr’s reported treatment of the Sayyed after learning that he was dying in front of his house raises suspicions.

Implications of Death Al-Khoei was considered a to be a moderate and respected voice among Iraqi religious leaders. His shocking death foreshadowed the violence Iraq was about to descend into. Had al-Khoei lived, he may have been able to prevent the cycles of violence that plagued Iraqis from 2003 to 2007, in which thousands were killed.

4. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam

Born/Died/Age 1941-1989 (age 47)

Base of Operations Afghanistan

Who Was He? Azzam was a Palestinian jihadi who led his forces against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He was killed by a roadside bomb.

Location of Death Peshawar, Pakistan

Likely Suspects Pakistani Intelligence, CIA, Mossad, Afghani Rivals

Best Guess Mossad is a likely suspect because, by 1989, the war had been won by the jihadis in Afghanistan, and Azzam was a strong advocate for the fight to be taken to Israel next.

Implications of Death Azzam was a mentor of Osama bin Laden throughout the anti-Soviet jihad. By brining bin Laden to Afghanistan, Azzam introduced him to the people and the land he would later use as his base of operations from which to attack the United States. Azzam’s opinions were published and widely read among jihadis.

3. Imam Musa Sadr

Born/Died/Age 1929 to 1978 (age 49 when disappeared)

Base of Operations Lebanon

Who Was He? Musa Sadr was an influential Shiite cleric who can be credited with starting the current Shia revival in Lebanon and throughout the Muslim world. Sadr used his influence to build hospitals and schools and established badly needed social services in poor Shiite neighborhoods in Lebanon.  Sadr went on to form the Shiite militia Amal.

Location of Death Disappeared on a visit to Tripoli in 1978; may not be dead

Likely Suspects Muammar Qaddafi

Best Guess Muammar Qaddafi  is the main suspect, as Sadr disappeared on a visit with the Libyan despot. Sadr may not technically qualify for this list as he might still be alive, but it is highly unlikely. Out of the recent chaos erupting in Libya came conflicting reports about the fate of Imam Sadr, with one saying he was being held deep in a Libyan prison, the other saying he had been killed and buried out in the desert. Sadr would be 82 today.

Implications of Death Sadr was a uniting voice in Lebanon, as well as an advocate for respect and harmony between country’s multiple religious sects. It’s been said that had he lived, Lebanon would have avoided the bloodiest parts of its Civil War (1975-1990). Even today, the mention of Sadr provokes a strong reaction among Lebanese Shia. His posters still adorn walls in every Shiite neighborhood throughout Lebanon as believers wait, one way or another, for his return.

In the recent measure passed by the UN Security Council regarding Libya, Lebanon was one of the few Arab countries that supported Western intervention. This is still a raw wound for many in Lebanon.

2. Imad Mugniyeh

Born/Died/Age 1962 to 2008 (age 45)

Base of Operations Lebanon

Who Was He? Considered an arch-terrorist by Western intelligence agencies, Imad Mugniyeh was a Palestinian Shiite from southern Lebanon. He started out in the PLO, eventually working his way up to become a bodyguard to Yassar Arafat. He has been linked to many events, including the 1983 bombing of a US Marine barracks in Beirut, the 1985 high jacking of a TWA airliner, the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina, the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and numerous kidnappings throughout the Lebanese Civil War.

Mugniyeh was involved in the formation of Hizballah in the early 1980’s. He was a particularly shadowy figure, even for the world of international terrorism. He worked with Hizballah, the PLO, Syrian intelligence, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). Mugniyeh is usually remembered as a member of Hizballah, but that may not be entirely accurate. He worked closely with the IRGC and his position may have been something closer to the Ayatollah’s black ops commander; Tehran (or Damascus) could use him when they wanted, but Hizballah would get all the blowback.

Mugniyeh had been in hiding for the better part of 15 years when he was killed, and his use by Hizballah during that time is questionable. This coincides with the transition (phasing out kidnapping and international terrorism while focusing on Israel) the group was undertaking after Hassan Nasrallah was named Hizballah Secretary General in 1992. He was killed by a car bomb.

Location of Death Damascus, Syria

Likely Suspects CIA, Mossad

Best Guess Mossad

Implications of Death Few outside of the PLO/IRGC/Hizballah community were sad to see him go. Hizballah continues to vow revenge for the “martyred” Mugniyeh. Although Nasrallah has made many public statements to the contrary, it’s conceivable that Nasrallah, while saddened by his death, was slightly relieved by it. Mugniyeh represented a link to Hizballah’s ultra-violent past as an international menace, and his death removed a big hurdle  for The Party of God in terms of legitimacy. Much more on Mugniyeh below.

1.  Rafik Hariri

Born/Died/Age 1944 to 2005 (age 60)

Base of Operations Lebanon

Who Was He? Hariri was a former Prime Minister of Lebanon who was assassinated on Valentine’s Day 2005 as his car passed through the Beirut seaside. He was a popular Sunni politician, a billionaire who was close friends with the president of France and the King of Saudi Arabia. During the latter years of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, Hariri was growing in influence and represented an increasingly formidable rival to Syria’s President Bashar Assad. In Syria, Assad’s Alawite regime rules over a Sunni majority, and the last thing he wanted to see was a powerful Sunni political presence in Lebanon to challenge his authority. For Syria, a strong Sunni Lebanon is bad news.

Location of Death Beirut, Lebanon

Likely Suspects Hizballah, Mossad, Syrian Intelligence

Best Guess My best guess is that Syrian Intelligence arranged the Hariri hit. They had motive (Hariri’s growing influence) and opportunity (Syria had thousands of troops and intelligence operatives stationed in Lebanon).  It also seems likely that Hariri’s death is linked to that of Imad Mugniyeh, a theory I have not heard anyone else present.

Syria is likely behind Hariri’s death, and soon after people connected with the hit began to turn up dead. It’s obvious that whoever killed Hariri would want to cover their tracks. Furthermore, it is widely believed (as Hassan Nasrallah himself stated) that members of Hizballah would be named when the UN tribunal tasked with investigating Hariri’s murder releases its findings.

Hizballah as an organization had little or nothing to gain by killing Hariri, and it is believed that Hariri had good relations with Nasrallah just before he was killed. It doesn’t make sense that “Hizballah” would kill a man whom the group was friendly with, but that doesn’t mean that “rougue members” of Hizballah weren’t involved.

This is where Mugniyeh comes in, as there was no one more rogue than he. If you were a high level Syrian intelligence official in Damascus and you wanted Hariri gone, who would you use? The logical choice is Mugniyeh: as a black ops veteran, he has proven that he is capable, and as a man (rightly or wrongly) associated throughout the world with Hizballah, he provides plausible deniability, which is always important in an assassination. Also, Mugniyeh is believed to be behind the spate of assassinations of journalists and politicians that were critical of Syria that came in the mid-2000’s.

Mugniyeh was living under Syrian state protection in Damascus when he was murdered. If the presence of the Syrian intelligence apparatus is strong in Beirut, it is omnipresent in Damascus. The Assad regime knew where Mugniyeh lived and he wouldn’t have been able to stay without permission.

So why the change of heart from Assad?  There are two, possibly three, reasons: One, Assad was likely concerned with the growing risks of harboring a known and widely-wanted international terrorist in the post 9/11 world. Two, he wanted to wipe out the mastermind behind the Hariri operation. And three, Assad was entering secret negotiations with Israel at the time of Mugniyeh’s death. What better way to eliminate a such a massive national security liability and offer a symbol of good faith to Israel than to turn over Mugniyeh to Mossad?

Mugniyeh’s death always bugged me. He was protected in Damascus, and the intelligence services no doubt kept a close eye on him. In addition to Syrian intel watching out for him, Mugniyeh was also a security mastermind in his own right. He eluded capture for years and only a handful of pictures and almost no written records exist of the man. A guy like this isn’t taken down unless someone sells him out, and the only ones in a position to do so were Assad’s people.

I keep coming back to it: if the regime in Damascus was behind the Hariri hit, who would they use? Most likely Mugniyeh, a man used many times before. The problem for Imad Mugniyeh is that he just became too much of a liability for Syria and it was time to go.  Whoever ordered the hit on Hariri is likely the same person that arranged or allowed for Mugniyeh’s death as well.

Implications of Death Lebanon still lives under the cloud of Rafik Hariri’s murder. After his death, massive protests erupted forcing Syria to end its 30 year occupation of Lebanon. It was a particularly tumultuous time for Lebanon, when people took sides with Syria or against Syria.

This is still the dominant political fault line today. Rafik Hariri’s son, Saad Hariri, went on to replace him as the head Sunni politician in Lebanon. The UN’s Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is still in the process of investigating Hariri’s murder, with findings expected to be released in the coming months. If Hizballah members are indicted by the Tribunal, the result could be a deeper, more serious rift between Sunnis and Shia of Lebanon and beyond.

It’s not known who the STL will name specifically, but is unlikely that it will be major players. Maybe someone who drove a car or used a cell phone in the operation, but probably not whoever planned it and almost certainly not whoever ordered it. Though it’s unlikely, Hizballah may very well have been behind the hit- meaning that upper leadership, including Nasrallah, approved the operation- but like I said, that is not likely. In any case, Hizballah seems to be taking the fall on this one, even if against their will.

Perhaps Hizballah members did participate in the hit, but that doesn’t mean they weren’t working at the direction of Syria. In this corner of the world, where sometimes the only way to get things done is with guns, bombs, and spies, who someone really works for is never quite clear.  However, maybe that’s all part of the bargain for Hizballah: in exchange for money and weapons from Syria and Iran, The Party of God has to provide political cover for its generous patrons every once in a while.

It seems to be a high price to pay.

Hariri and Hizballah

Editor’s note: this article originally appears on the Foreign Policy Association website.

Last Sunday, Saad Hariri’s March 14 coalition held a rally in Beirut to commemorate the six-year anniversary of the group’s founding. In front of a crowd of thousands, Hariri questioned the usefulness of heavily armed non-state actors in Lebanon, and said that the Lebanese state should have a monopoly on the use of force. Hariri was referring to Hizballah, the only Lebanese group to retain its weapons after the Civil War ended in 1990.

The issue of Hizballah’s arms is highly controversial in Lebanon. Lebanon has a sizable population of Shia Muslims (estimated around 40% of the country’s total population), a historically disenfranchised lot who credit their recent political ascension in large part to Hizballah, its strategies, and its weapons. Lebanese Shia might agree that no other group should be allowed to have weapons in competition with the state, but when it comes to the Party of God, they find the concept acceptable.

Lebanon’s Shia did not get where they are today by the goodwill of the Christians and the Sunnis; they got there by Hizballah’s use of force, cunning, and ruthlessness. However, the amount of MP’s allocated to the various sects is still skewed in favor of the Christian parties and, all things considered, the Shia still have a long way to go to achieve an equitable share of seats in parliament in relation to their numbers.

Lebanon’s whole political system, from the National Pact (1943) to the Taif Accords (1989) to the Doha Agreement (2008) is based upon harmony between the sects. As time has gone by, it has become clear that these are only band-aids to Lebanon’s real political problem: the system does not reflect the demographic reality. The Christians (and to some extent the Sunnis) know their numbers have dwindled (due to emigration and lower birthrates), yet they are reluctant to change the Lebanese government to reflect this shift because they will be the ones to lose out.

The Daily Star’s Michael Young recently wrote an interesting article on this topic, proposing that March 14 should offer the Shia additional political powers in exchange for Hizballah relinquishing their weapons. Young stopped short of calling for a one-man-one-vote system, where each sect would have an accurate representation in the government, but the move could force Hizballah to choose between its weapons and its people.

Young calls Hizballah’s weapons “the elephant in the room”, but in Lebanon elephants abound*. The outdated and unfair political allocations are the deeper problem, because as long as there is a disparity between population and power, there will always be insecurity in the form of weapons to make up the difference.  This mis-allocation will continue to haunt Lebanon until a more representative system takes its place.

*The STL is one, Syrian influence is another.

Saad Hariri’s call for Hizballah to disarm occurs when March 14’s power and influence is at a low point. Hizballah, fearing some of its members would be fingered by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (the hybrid UN-Lebanese body tasked with investigating the assassination of Rafik Hariri), wanted Hariri to withdraw his support for the Tribunal. When Hariri refused, Hizballah and its allies maneuvered to oust him as Prime Minister. Ironically, up until the time he was pushed out of office, Hariri’s government publicly supported Hizballah’s weapons as an integral part of Lebanon defenses.

The time to call for Hizballah to disarm was when March 14 was in power, when dealing from a position of relative strength. However, March 14 had only won by a slim majority in the June 2009 parliamentary elections, and without a clear mandate from the people, they needed the help of the opposition to form a government. Hariri knew he needed Hizballah’s help and it would have been political suicide to make enemies with them straight away after taking power.

Throughout his term in office however, that reality never changed. Now Hariri is fighting for his political life and calling for Hizballah to lay down their arms will likely sit well with his constituents as he tries to re-energize his base.

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In light of the unrest sweeping the region, it is interesting to ponder what the current state of Lebanon’s Shiites would be today had Hizballah never existed (if Israel and the PLO had never invaded). It is not hard to imagine this marginalized group taking to the streets and to demand reform, similar to the Bahraini Shia today. Would then Lebanon be in a more stable position in which to reform, or would the powers that be use force to maintain the status quo? As with current day Bahrain, the answer is probably closer to the latter than the former, with the reason being that any political advancement by the Shia is seen by Sunnis and the West as a win for Iran, a preconception that has led to disaster in the region for the United States.

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Speaking of which, no discussion of Hizballah’s arms is complete without mentioning Iran. Hizballah is part of Iran’s national security strategy. The group’s stronghold of South Lebanon abuts with Israel and represents the “tip of the spear” for Iran should Israel attempt military action on Persian soil. The reality is, whether true or not, Israel and Iran represent existential threats to each other and their foreign policies reflect this. As a result, Iran has supported Hizballah with hundreds of millions of dollars in cash and arms since helping to form the group in the early 1980’s.

If Hizballah were to disarm, it would be effectively abandoning its duty to keep Israel in check, thereby increasing the likelihood of Israeli military operations against Iran. For Tehran, losing Hizballah would be a nightmare. For Hizballah’s part, the group would be hard pressed to replace the financial support of Iran, nor does it want to. One of Hizballah’s stated “pillars” of existence is to resist Israel, and the group has many times pledged its allegiance to the Ayatollahs of Iran.

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Right now, Hariri is trying to rally his political base by calling for Hizballah to disarm. He knows this is what a large portion of the people want to hear. But what good is having a huge rally for your cause when Hizballah could do the same the very next day. We already know Lebanon is divided and that each side can produce large crowds at their rallies. If Hariri really wants to disarm the group, he would have to create to space between Hizballah (the Party of God) and the Shiites themselves.

Michael Young’s aforementioned strategy is closer to this: offer Hizballah weapons for power and let the Shia watch The Party make their choice. If Hizballah chooses to disarm, great. If they choose to keep their weapons at the expense of increased political power for their people, then their hand will be played for the world to see.

The problem is that both the Christians and the Sunni will have to give up power in order the achieve it. Unfortunately, no one in March 14 seems to be thinking about what makes Lebanon more stable in the long run and every day that goes by sees Hizballah increase its power.

In the past, Lebanese politicians have called for Hizballah’s arms to be folded into the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). If major political concessions and adjustments aren’t made in the near future,  one day we could be hearing Hassan Nasrallah calling for the LAF to be folded into Hizballah.